Pascal's Wager is an item which comes up often in my discussions with Evangelicals. The basic gist of this old argument runs, basically, thusly: Hell sucks a lot, perhaps infinitely, so even if the chance of the Christian Cosmology being true is apparently small, it is worth assuming it is correct for the sake of avoiding damnation. This is usually proffered in a halo of secondary claims like "Living a Christian life is basically good and healthy also - so what do you have to lose?"
The argument is a bad one. I'd really love to see people stop making it, because bad arguments, even for True things, are a kind of lie.
It is bad for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that it poses a tremendous false dichotomy. The world is divided into "Christianity" on one hand and some kind of unnamed life of nihilism, probably destructive behavior on the other, as if these were the only two possible things a person could believe, as if only Christians behave well and everyone else is out whoring it up with cocaine all over their face. Non-Christians probably even drink alcohol, it is no doubt whispered. This puts Pascal's Wager in the unfortunately not so strange position of being one of those evangelical arguments which only makes sense if you basically already accept the rough outline of the Christian Universe.
The world, unfortunately, is not so clinically delineated. It is more realistically perceived as an almost sickly tumor of competing worldviews - each casting for human thought and each threatening one or the other kind of damnation for the wrong choice. A Christian is deluding himself if he believes that his faith should depend on a wager, because worshiping Jesus-as-God makes him a blasphemer to a variety of other faiths, and puts him on the fast track to damnation in them, if he has wagered incorrectly.
I will contribute my voice to the cacophony and suggest that, to devote oneself in error to falsehood, when life is transient and mind is precious, is a profound misuse of a person, among other moral wrongs. This leads me to the main content of this post.
This is a pretty nice, pretty fair, article on transgendered children. The article follows a family as they try to cope with their youngest child's insistence on a female gender for itself. The child is externally male, but has, from more or less day one, insisted that "he" is a "she," and has engaged in play towards this end.
I don't think anyone would suggest that this does not pose serious moral questions for the parents and for us.
One of the more beautiful aspects of Catholicism is the deep integration of gender roles into the theology of the Church. It may be that there will be no husbands and wives in the kingdom heaven, but until that point, the Church will be festooned with linked images of man and wife. Gender is a fundamental concept in Catholic Theology, one of the "real symbols" which represents and "is" a higher truth. The Church is the Bride of Christ, the Marriage is a microcosm of the relationship between God and Man, Christ's Sacrifice repairs the fundamental damage to the male-female relationship done by The Fall, where it all started, for us, anyway.
Similar, if faded, images, course around the wilderness of Protestantism.
Neither group deals well with human behavior which implies gender is a statistical, rather than elemental, phenomenon. That nature might make a man who loves men, or a woman who loves women, or a person who has no sexual identity whatsoever. The child in the Atlantic piece has an Evangelical friend whose parents put it bluntly: "God doesn't make mistakes."
In other words, in a universe with a person-God, where gender is an fundamental symbol/reality which fits into the narrative of the universe like a puzzle-piece, the intersexed and/or transgendered simply cannot happen.
This isn't necessarily the conclusion of theological thought, but it is the most obvious, and one frequently intuitively landed upon by the average person. To these people, deviations from the standard gender roles is necessarily the product of illness - either spiritual or physical, and measures prophylactic to the soul must be applied, perhaps in love or pity, but unavoidably.
It is not possible to view gender confusion as a difficult, but essentially morally neutral, situation for a consciousness to be in, which is how I see it. It is not possible to view the human mind at the center of the dysphoria as the essential object to be protected, and the statistically likely genders as mere coincidences in an ebullient universe, coincidences to be shaped, distorted or dispensed with entirely in the pursuit of the greater dignity of the mind.
An equivalently meaningful argument to Pascal's Wager is that to believe in a moral cosmology, at least any self-respecting one, requires that we restrict our behaviors in ways which have real, tangible consequences for real, living humans. If we are wrong about the supernatural, if we have no treasures waiting in heaven for us, then we have committed an awful wrong in treating transgendered people, for instance, as though they simply cannot exist, and must be ill.
If there is no God, then the universe is not going to provide peace for us, or wisdom. We cannot assume that mankind is not on the road to one or another kind of oblivion. It is dangerous to believe that there is someone driving the school bus when you do not know. Christianity may be right, maybe someone is driving, but I prefer to suggest that we be honest with ourselves, and if the driver's seat is empty, that we put humans in it, not a fiction draped over an unthinking cosmos.
Toups,
Does one have the luxury of simply believing or not believing in ideal forms? Wouldn't they either exist or not exist? And if they do not exist, what does that imply about one's ability to reason?
October 3, 2008 10:50 AM
Ideal forms are a solution looking for a problem. When they were conceived, the problem was that people could recognize various objects as belonging to categories and the process by which this occurred seemed to require some large sense of "what things actually are."
These days we know how you recognize a chair for a chair. A series of neural networks analyze various components of your sensory input for properties and if enough properties are operant in that stream, they eventually activate a network of neurons corresponding to a fuzzy category of "things I call chairs so that I can communicate with other people." There is no need to postulate an abstract chair being anywhere. The notion of chair is much better explained as the activity of some neurons in your brain.
October 3, 2008 10:57 AM
In other words, I am not going to take seriously the notion of "ideal forms" until you give me a single piece of tangible evidence that I need them to understand some phenomenon in the world around me.
October 3, 2008 10:59 AM
So you are saying that chairs are chairs, and one chair is not better than another or closer to the ideal chair than another (since no ideal chair exists). And so it follows that one might perceive a chair as being better than another, but that is really only her preference. Is that right? (feel free to begin a new post).
October 3, 2008 11:51 AM